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A space is not without law just because it 
is cyber 
In cyberspace, the traditional country borders are
cleared during the actions of the cyber criminal. The
borders return later, when the detectives try to trace the
actions of the criminal or terrorist, searching digital
evidence possibly left by the author, and so useful for
the investigation. The main problem (it is even a cultural
problem), is, as all detectives know, that cyberspace
favours the suspects. Each time a cyber crime is
reported across jurisdictions, it is necessary to ask the
States affected to collaborate with the investigation,
usually through a formal rogatory. Of greater
importance, are the businesses providing electronic
services with servers in another State, and whose
servers and services the criminal act has used in some
way. In theory, it is conceivable that a commercial entity
will be nimble in responding to a legitimate request
from another State to collaborate in tracking down a
criminal. But this does not happen. The commercial
sector moves at a far slower pace than our counterparts
across the world. Invariably, a barrier is immediately
erected to any request with the excuse that they cannot
help because it is not possible according to domestic
law. This is what usually happens in relation to the
electronic services provided by three of the most
important internet businesses: Google, Yahoo! and
Microsoft. The difficulty with intercepting the flow of
communications in reasonably short time is a general
problem, and it does not only apply to Skype.2
‘No server no law’ v ‘no server but law’ 
We more often find ourselves dealing with opinions that
differ. On the one side, there is the ‘no server no law’
view. Preference is given to the geographical location
where the web servers are based: and often, the servers
are outside the European Community. This is the case in
respect of Google, Yahoo! and Microsoft. This first point
of view considers that national or European laws cannot
be enforced because the web servers are in the United
States of America. Of interest, regarding Skype, the
servers could not be precisely identified (and therefore
not intercepted), since they are organized as peer-to-
peer nodes. On the other side, there is the opinion that I
prefer, the ‘no server but law’ opinion. This view
considers that the crucial point is the geographical
location where the web services are offered, no matter
where the web servers are, even for the purposes of law
enforcement. As I usually say, the server may be
elsewhere, but the mouse is in Italy.
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1 This article is adapted from the speech of the
author at the First Strategic Meeting on Cybercrime
organised by Eurojust in Athens, 23-24 October
2008 (many thanks to Luisa and Valeria Viganò for
the review). For the press release, see
http://www.eurojust.europa.eu/press_releases/200
8/30-10-2008.htm.
2 Declan McCullagh, ‘Skype: We can’t comply with
police wiretap requests’, cnet news, 9 June 2008,
available at http://news.cnet.com/8301-13578_3-
9963028-38.html.
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Three scenarios
Essentially, there are three scenarios that affect the
investigation of alleged crimes that include the use of
networked communications. They can overlap, but the
three that we need to consider can be divided into the
availability of encrypted communication technology, the
communication channel and communication data. Each
are considered in turn below. The Italian law regulates
each scenario in a different way, and there are no
reported decisions in relation to these matters at the
time of writing. An important problem regarding each of
these is also the length of time the data is retained.
The availability of encrypted communication
technology
In the case of Skype and other Voice over Internet
Protocol (VoIP) communications generally, the
communication is encrypted. It is only possible to
intercept a VoIP communication only when the
investigating authority knows the exact location of the
suspect’s computer. The investigating authority will try
to obtain access to the computer and install a program
to enable interception to take place, and where it is not
possible to reach the computer physically, social
engineering techniques will be used to achieve the
same aim. Naturally, it is only possible to undertake
these actions with the authorization of a judge.
The availability of a communication channel 
The vast flow of communications between people is now
through e-mail systems. Often, the people under
investigation are present in Italy, but they might use an
e-mail system based abroad, such as Google or
Microsoft: this occurs frequently, hence the reference to
the ‘no server no law’ opinion. In fact it was not possible
in this case to enforce an order issued by the judge. The
order that could not be enforced, requested that the e-
mail accounts be intercepted by having the e-mail traffic
redirected to the judicial police account. This method
reduces costs, and permits the interception to begin
quickly. This method is used when making similar
requests to the national ISPs with servers in Italy. The
alternative mechanism is for the judicial police to notify
Google Italia or Microsoft Italia (both with registered
offices in Milan) of the interception order. However, their
response is to indicate that the servers are in the United
States of America, and they request a rogatory before
they will implement the interception order. This is not
good if the investigation concerns a murder or a
kidnapping. The situation is the same as with Skype – it
is almost impossible to intercept communications. Only
Yahoo! Italia (their registered office is in Milan) has an
item of software called ‘Yahoo! Account Management
Tool’. This software allows e-mail to be intercepted, but
it is of limited help.
The availability of communication data
This scenario refers to data relating to the use of the
internet, such as log files. In the experience of some
Italian investigation agencies, Microsoft Italia was the
first to provide – without a rogatory but only with a
request from the Italian Public Prosecutor – such data,
not only referred to @hotmail.it e-mail, but including
@hotmail.com. At first, Google Italia considered it was
necessary for a rogatory, but they changed their policy,
and now provide all the data requested, providing the
request is accompanied with an order from the Italian
Public Prosecutor (not only from the Italian Judicial
Police). Nevertheless, if an IP address (logged by the
Google electronic systems with regard to an e-mail
@gmail.com) is not related to an Italian server, Google
does not consider it is permitted to communicate it to
the Italian Judicial Authority. In comparison, Yahoo! Italia
request a rogatory, but only in some cases.
Preliminary matters
In order to be better prepared to investigate alleged
crimes, investigators have had to assemble lists of
relevant information in relation to each Internet service
provider (ISP), including: where the web servers are
physically located; where the registered office of the ISP
is located, and if the ISP has an operating branch in the
State where the investigation is conducted. It is also
necessary to know (in order to verify potential criminal
liability) if the employees in the operating branches are
in effective control of the local affairs of the ISP, or
whether they are mere legal representatives.
Jurisdiction analysis as applied in the
United States of America 
If the ‘no server no law’ opinion is accepted, it will be
interesting to know what view an American judge would
take. The scenario is as follows: the ISP is an American
company which also has a physical base in Europe and
offers its services to European citizens; the ISP insists
that their web servers are in one of the US states, for
example in California, and as a result, the ISP is not
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subject to the laws of the Member State in which they
have an office. The same could be argued in reverse. An
Italian ISP uses the identical argument to a Federal
court in the US, that is: ‘sorry, but our servers are in
Italy’. Or, the same American company with servers in
California summoned in a different US Court (for
example: Arizona). It is debatable whether a US judge
will accept such an argument. Consider how the judges
in the US analyse internet jurisdiction.3 Judges in the US
have developed two general lines of analysis in
determining whether jurisdiction can be exercised in
cases involving internet activity. The first, a ‘sliding
scale’ approach, seeks to classify the ‘nature and
quality’ of the commercial activity, if any, that the
defendant conducts over the internet.4 The second
analysis, called the ‘effects test’, seeks to determine to
what extent a defendant’s intentional conduct takes
place outside the forum State.5 So, for a number of
years, the US state courts have been using an
undisputed analysis, providing for US jurisdiction, even
if the web site is based on a server in another country.
This means that a foreign internet entrepreneur,
although lacking ‘continuous and systematic’ contacts
with any US forum state sufficient to subject him or her
to general jurisdiction, may nonetheless be subject to
personal jurisdiction in the US based on two broad
theories of ‘specific’ personal jurisdiction. Under the
Zippo ‘sliding scale’ analysis, a US court will classify the
‘nature and quality’ of any commercial activity that is
conducted over the internet and place it on a continuum
ranging from ‘passive’, where no business is conducted,
to ‘clearly conducting business’. The closer the internet
activities are to ‘clearly conducting business’, the more
likely that a US court will exercise personal jurisdiction.
Courts may also apply the Calder ‘effects test’ to
determine whether the intentional conduct of the party
was calculated to cause harm to the plaintiff within the
forum state. Where a defendant ‘purposefully directs’
his activities towards the jurisdiction, he may be liable
to legal action for any injury relating to or arising from
those activities.
Obligations and national laws to observe 
At this point, the important question is to identify the
obligations and national laws that we can be expected
to observe. In Italy, the provisions of Decreto legislativo
1° agosto 2003, n. 259, Codice delle comunicazioni
elettroniche6 (Legislative Decree of 1st August 2003, n.
259 electronic communication rules) are fundamental.
These rules have their origin in four EC Directives.7 An
important step has been taken by the Italian Ministero
dello Sviluppo Economico (Ministry of Economic
Development and Telecommunication), in that it has
recently provided a written opinion (note of 12
September 2008, following a specific request of the
Direzione Nazionale Antimafia) according to which
Skype connections must be included in the electronic
communication rules and are therefore subject to the
general authorization provided by the law.
Consequently this involves the observance of the
rules about the compulsory services required by the
judicial authority and, in particular, to enable a legal
interception to take place by competent national
authorities, as also set out in article 6 of EC Directive
2002/20/EC, the Authorisation Directive:
3 G. J. H. Smith, Internet law and regulation, (Sweet
and Maxwell, 3rd edition, 2002), 347-349.
4 Zippo Manufacturing Co. v Zippo Dot Com, Inc.,
952 F. Supp. 1119 (W.D. Pa.1997).
5 Calder v Jones, 465 U.S. 783 (1984).
6 Pubblicato sulla Gazzetta Ufficiale n.214 del 15
settembre 2003.
7 Directive 2002/19/EC of the European Parliament
and of the Council of 7 March 2002 on access to,
and interconnection of, electronic communications
networks and associated facilities (Access
Directive), OJ L 108, 24.4.2002, p. 7; Directive
2002/20/EC of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 7 March 2002 on the authorisation of
electronic communications networks and services
(Authorisation Directive), OJ L 108, 24.4.2002, p.
21; Directive 2002/21/EC of the European
Parliament and of the Council of 7 March 2002 on a
common regulatory framework for electronic
communications networks and services (“the
Framework Directive”), OJ L 108, 24.4.2002, p. 33;
Directive 2002/22/EC of the European Parliament
and of the Council of 7 March 2002 on universal
service and users’ rights relating to electronic
communications networks and services (Universal
Service Directive), OJ L 108, 24.4.2002, p. 51.
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Article 6
Conditions attached to the general authorisation and
to the rights of use for radio frequencies and for
numbers, and specific obligations
1. The general authorisation for the provision of
electronic communications networks or services and
the rights of use for radio frequencies and rights of
use for numbers may be subject only to the
conditions listed respectively in parts A, B and C of
the Annex. Such conditions shall be objectively
justified in relation to the network or service
concerned, non-discriminatory, proportionate and
transparent
The relevant condition listed in the Annex is item 11:
11. Enabling of legal interception by competent
national authorities in conformity with Directive
97/66/EC and Directive 95/46/EC of the European
Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on
the protection of individuals with regard to the
processing of personal data and on the free
movement of such data.
The combination of article 6 and paragraph 11 of the
Annex could mean: if, for instance, in the future Skype
decides to open a branch in Italy, this will be sufficient
market conditions to enable Italian investigating
authorities to require Skype to intercept
communications if ordered so to do.
Secondly, we could expect the observance of the data
retention rules (Decreto legislativo 30 maggio 2008, n.
109 – Legislative Decree of 30 May 2008, n. 109).8 The
provisions of articles 3 and 6 of Directive 2006/24/EC
are relevant, and provide as follows:
Article 3
Obligation to retain data
1. By way of derogation from Articles 5, 6 and 9 of
Directive 2002/58/EC, Member States shall adopt
measures to ensure that the data specified in Article 5
of this Directive are retained in accordance with the
provisions thereof, to the extent that those data are
generated or processed by providers of publicly
available electronic communications services or of a
public communication network within their
jurisdiction in the process of supplying the
communications services concerned.
2. The obligation to retain data provided for in
paragraph 1 shall include the retention of the data
specified in Article 5 relating to unsuccessful call
attempts where those data are generated or
processed, and stored (as regards elephony data) or
logged (as regards Internet data), by providers of
publicly available electronic communications services
or of a public communications network within the
jurisdiction of the Member State concerned in the
process of supplying the communication services
concerned. This Directive shall not require data
relating to unconnected calls to be retained.
Article 6
Periods of retention
Member States shall ensure that the categories of
data specified in Article 5 are retained for periods of
not less than six months and not more than two years
from the date of the communication.
It is clearly the opinion of Peter Schaar, President of the
Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, that any EC
rules can be applied to the organizations that turn their
attention to provide services to European citizens:
‘Although Google’s headquarters are based in the
United States, Google is under legal obligation to
comply with European laws, in particular privacy laws,
as Google’s service are provided to European citizens
and it maintains data processing activities in Europe,
especially the processing of personal data that takes
place at its European centre’9
It therefore follows that the obligations of data retention
also apply to Google, Yahoo! and Microsoft.
Finally, it is to be observed that the United States of
America ratified the Council of Europe Convention on
Cybercrime (Budapest, 23.XI.2001) on 29 September
8 Based on Directive 2006/24/EC of the European
Parliament and of the Council of 15 March 2006 on
the retention of data generated or processed in
connection with the provision of publicly available
electronic communications services or of public
communications networks and amending Directive
2002/58/EC, OJ L 105, 13/04/2006 P. 0054 – 0063.
9 Letter from Peter Schaar to Peter Fleischer dated 16
May 2007, D(2007) 6016, available at
http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/fsj/privacy/news/
docs/pr_google_16_05_07_en.pdf.
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2006, which provides for two precise obligations of
cooperation in articles 33 and 34:
Article 33 – Mutual assistance regarding the real-time
collection of traffic data
1 The Parties shall provide mutual assistance to each
other in the real-time collection of traffic data
associated with specified communications in their
territory transmitted by means of a computer system.
Subject to the provisions of paragraph 2, this
assistance shall be governed by the conditions and
procedures provided for under domestic law.
2 Each Party shall provide such assistance at least
with respect to criminal offences for which real-time
collection of traffic data would be available in a
similar domestic case.
Article 34 – Mutual assistance regarding the
interception of content data
The Parties shall provide mutual assistance to each
other in the real-time collection or recording of
content data of specified communications transmitted
by means of a computer system to the extent
permitted under their applicable treaties and
domestic laws.
Therefore, when a State such as Italy ratifies the
Convention,10 specific duties arise. As the ancient
Romans said, and as the rules of international law
remind us: agreements must be kept (pacta sunt
servanda).
In particular, whereas US ISPs continue to consider
that EU laws do not apply to them, the national judicial
authorities will continue to act within the law in a
reasonable and proper way11 and will insist for an
action12 not only of the European administrative
authorities, of the US authorities, even if it is necessary
to enforce the 2001 Council of Europe Convention on
Cybercrime.
Yahoo! Italia and the Public Prosecutor’s
Office in Milan
In 2007, the Public Prosecutor’s Office in Milan had
some difficulty with Yahoo! Italia around the ‘Net
Citizenship’ concept. That is: when an Italian user
registers an account from the webpage www.yahoo.it,
he can choose which law his e-mail correspondence will
be subject to. There is an item of software called Yahoo!
Account Management Tool, which is used by all the
Yahoo! branches. It returns the communications stored
in e-mail boxes (@yahoo.it and @yahoo.com or both),
but only in respect of those users that agree that Italian
law applies. The investigation authorities can intercept
these e-mails, even without a rogatory. However, these
e-mails only have a retention period of between 30 and
45 days, against a period of twelve months.13 As a result,
some investigations suffer. One occasion, a Yahoo! mail
box was the subject of interception without any results.
This meant that no e-mails were received at all. The
investigators could see that no e-mails were received.
The suspect, a Romanian phisher, was arrested. He
provided the access credentials to the mail box that had
been intercepted. It was discovered that there were a
number of messages that had been received in the
period when the mail box had been subjected to
interception. During the period the mail box was the
subject of interception, a great number of Yahoo!
employees were free to enter the Yahoo! Account
Management Tool from several of the European
branches of Yahoo! This fact could damage the users’
privacy, and not only the police investigation. The
indictment was transferred to the Garante per la
protezione dei dati personali (Italian Privacy Authority),
who confirmed the technical investigation and that the
10 The Convention was signed by Italy on 23
November 2001, ratified on 5 June 2008, in force on
1 October 2008; Legge 18 marzo 2008, n. 48
Ratifica ed esecuzione della Convenzione del
Consiglio d’Europa sulla criminalità informatica,
fatta a Budapest il 23 novembre 2001, e norme di
adeguamento dell’ordinamento interno
(Pubblicato sulla Gazzetta Ufficiale 4 aprile 2008,
n. 80; s.o. n. 79) (Law of 18 March 2008, n. 48).
11 On 2 March 2009, a court in Dendermonde,
Belgium, found Yahoo guilty of withholding
personal account information linked to Yahoo e-
mail addresses. This decision is in the process of
being appealed. Note from the editor: it is
antipicated that a full report on this case will be
included in the 2010 issue of the journal.
12 According to Article 10 of Directive 2006/24/EC of
the European Parliament and of the Council of 15
March 2006 on the retention of data generated or
processed in connection with the provision of
publicly available electronic communications
services or of public communications networks and
amending Directive 2002/58/EC OJl L 105,
13/04/2006 P. 0054 - 0063, ‘Member States shall
ensure that the Commission is provided on a yearly
basis with statistics on the retention of data
generated or processed in connection with the
provision of publicly available electronic
communications services or a public
communications network. Such statistics shall
include … the cases where requests for data could
not be met’. See also Decreto legislativo 30
maggio 2008, n. 109, which provides fees from
50,000.00 to 150,000.00 euros for failing to retain
data for 12 months.
13 In accordance with Directive 2006/24/EC of the
European Parliament and of the Council of 15
March 2006 on the retention of data generated or
processed in connection with the provision of
publicly available electronic communications
services or of public communications networks and
amending Directive 2002/58/EC, OJ L 105,
13/04/2006 P. 0054 – 0063; implemented by
Decreto legislativo 30 maggio 2008, n. 109.
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legal approach taken by us was correct. Meanwhile, the
attorneys for Yahoo! Italia indicated to the Public
Prosecutor’s Office in Milan that the company would
spontaneously conform to Decreto legislativo 30 maggio
2008, n. 109, by storing log files for twelve months in
future.14 Apparently this will be enforced across all EC
states, and started from 21 November 2007. In my
opinion, it could not be different: we are in presence of
societies which must be included in the provisions of
article 3 of Directive 2002/58/EC:15
Article 3
Services concerned
1. This Directive shall apply to the processing of
personal data in connection with the provision of
publicly available electronic communications services
in public communications networks in the Community.
It is for such reasons, and independently from where the
servers are physically located, they are required to
comply with the obligations of the Italian and EC data
retention rules.
Concluding comments
In conclusion, let me take a strictly personal view: each
time I manage to come to Athens, I like to have a walk
through the Agorà and go as far as the Monument of the
Eponymous Heroes: this is the place where the
legislation, decrees and announcements were shown,
so that the Athenian citizens could see and know them.
Well, today we have a lot of ‘shown’ laws, yet there are
many people who pretend not to see them, hiding
behind a ‘cyberspace virtuality’. But this very
cyberspace not only feeds such companies with their
profits, but facilitates crime. There is a need to balance
the rights of people that are the victims of a crime,
against the econimics of the ISPs. The words by which
the historian Herodotus of Halicarnassus described
what Demaratos said of the Lacedemonians are
relevant:16
‘So also the Lacedemonians are not inferior to any
men when fighting one by one, and they are the best
of all men when fighting in a body: for though free,
yet they are not free in all things, for over them is set
Law as a master, whom they fear much more even
than thy people fear thee. It is certain at least that
they do whatsoever that master commands; and he
commands ever the same thing, that is to say, he bids
them not flee out of battle from any multitude of men,
but stay in their post and win the victory or lose their
life.’
Many commentators have seen in this affirmation the
first statement of that ‘Government of the Law’,
according to which the existence of a law distinguished
the Greeks from the non-Greeks, and for this reason
defined ‘barbarians’: therefore, in those times, for the
Greeks:17
Du Démarate d’Hérodote au Platon de la lettre VII, en
passant par le Thésée d’Euripide, la tradition est bien
la même. Elle implique un sens aigu de cette loi
comune que les citoyens avaient su se donner et dont
ils attendaient à la fois le bon ordre et la liberté. Pour
eux, déja, la liberté se définissait comme l’obéissance
aux lois.
Of Démarate from Herodotus to Plato of letter VII,
while passing by Theseus of Euripides, the tradition is
the same. It implies an acute sense of this common
law that the citizens had known to be given and from
which they expected to both order and freedom. For
them, freedom is already defined as obedience to the
laws.
Today, we often talk about the internet as a space of
freedom. As a Public Prosecutor, who is fond of
information technologies, my wish and my hope is that
this ‘freedom’ can really come true. The danger of a
different concept of freedom, meant as the absence of
laws, is a barbarity to be opposed.
© Francesco Cajani, 2009
14 The Request for Archiving (not to prosecute and to
close the case) was submitted to the court on 16
October 2008, and agreed by the judge, Dr
Gaetano Brusa, on 25 March 2009. The Request is
published at the end of this article.
15 Directive 2002/58/EC of the European Parliament
and of the Council of 12 July 2002 concerning the
processing of personal data and the protection of
privacy in the electronic communications sector
(Directive on privacy and electronic
communications), OJ L 201, 31.7.2002, p. 37–47.
16 The Histories, VII, 104. (Translation of G. C.
Macaulay, available at http://www.gutenberg.org/
files/2456/2456-h/book7.htm).
17 Jacqueline de Romilly, La loi dans le pensèe
grecque, (1971, Belles letters, Paris), 23.
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REQUEST FOR ARCHIVING
Criminal proceedings no. 43083/07 R.G.N.R. mod. 21
Office of the Prosecutor of the Republic at the Court of Milan
REQUEST FOR ARCHIVING*
~ artt. 408/411 Code of Criminal proceedings, 
125/126 Legislative Decree no. 271/89 ~
To the Judge for preliminary investigations
* This is an official act to determine not to prosecute the defendant (the Managing Director of Yahoo! Italy s.r.l.) and to
close the criminal case, in accordance with the provisions of the Decreto legislativo 30 giugno 2003, n. 196, Codice in
materia di protezione dei dati personali (Pubblicato sulla GU n.174 del 29-7-2003 - Suppl. Ordinario n.123) (Personal
Data Protection Code (Privacy Code - Legislative Decree no. 196 dated 30 June 2003)), Section 169: ‘Security Measures.
1. Whoever fails to adopt the minimum measures referred to in Section 33 in breach of the relevant obligations shall be
punished by detention for up to two years. 2. A time limit shall be set either upon detecting the abovementioned offence
or, in complex cases, by way of a subsequent provision issued by the Garante (i.e. Privacy Authority), for the offender to
comply with the requirements referred to above. Said time limit shall not exceed the time span that is technically
required; however, it may be extended in especially complex cases or else because of objective difficulties in complying,
but it shall not be longer than six months. Within sixty days of the expiry of the above deadline, the offender shall be
permitted by the Garante to pay one-fourth of the highest fine that can be imposed in connection with the administrative
violation, on condition that the relevant requirements have been complied with. Compliance and performance of the
abovementioned payment shall extinguish the offence. The body setting the time limit and the Public Prosecutor shall
abide by the provisions made in Sections 21, 22, 23 and 24 of Legislative Decree no. 758 of 19.12.1994, as subsequently
amended, insofar as they are applicable’. For the text of Italian Privacy Code (English version) see
http://www.garanteprivacy.it/garante/document?ID=1219452.
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REQUEST FOR ARCHIVING
at the Court of Milan
The Public Prosecutor
having regard to acts of criminal proceedings in the above mentioned request,
entered in the register of criminal proceedings to be processed under art. 335 Code
of Criminal proceedings on 23 October 2007 against:
M.M.
Defended in confidence [...]**
in the case of crime:
Arts. 169 Legislative Decree no. 196/2003, 81 paragraph 2 Criminal Code
ascertained in Milan on 2 October 2006 and continuing until July 2008 (date of
fulfilment of the requirements issued by the Authority for personal data protection).
WHEREAS
1. Investigations conducted by the office of the Prosecutor of the Republic in Milan
(arising from the de facto impossibility of being able to conclude the criminal police
investigation in the light of the complaint reported by the complainant on 12
September 2005)1 pointed out, in relation to the suspect’s conduct – in his powers
** This is addressed to the lawyer who is appointed by the defendant.
1. The issue is the sending of pornographic pictures to the girl that complained of unauthorised use – at the hands of
third parties not identified (given the negative response of Yahoo! Italia s.r.l. to the Carabinieri of Bresso, dated 10
February 2006, given the storage period for the log files “only for the last 30 days from the date of ascertaining the
crime”) of the mailbox @yahoo.it given for the use of the person that is offended. Deeds as of criminal proceedings no.
78193/05 mod. 44 of the official records, for which – also in view of a measure by the GIP (Giudice per le Indagini
Preliminari, i.e. ‘Judge for the Preliminary Investigations’) of refusing to collect additional and different log files (the term
of 12 months having expired as provided for by the combined provisions of article 132 paragraphs 1 and 4 of Legislative
Decree no. 196/2003) – archival was required.
More specifically, the dogmatic approach supported by this Prosecutor – under the previous legislation in accordance
with art. 132 of the Privacy Code – was attempting to obtain the systematic data in order to deem, however, also allowed
an application for the GIP even beyond expiration of the terms of 12 months (since the combined provisions of arts. 132
paragraphs 1 and 4 Legislative Decree no. 196/2003 – as amended by Law no. 155/2005 – do not put a limit on the
request to the GIP of telematic traffic data, providing only that “after the expiration” of 6 months the PM (Pubblico
Ministero, i.e. ‘Public Prosecutor’) could not independently enforce this acquisition; the obligation requiring the
retention of data was for “twelve months” but this did not exclude the possibility that they were held by telephone
operators for a longer period, as is conceivable in light of the “moratorium” until December 2007, (later extended)
except where the data is legitimately disregarded by the operator. This approach, however, was hampered by the GIP for
the following reasons: “although the rule does not contain an explicit prohibition to retain data beyond the specified
retention period (assuming that they were actually kept), these provisions being exceptional, because they are
restrictive provisions of the right to privacy – the protection of which they are aiming to – an extensive interpretation is
not admissible, beyond the expressly provided cases, otherwise an arbitrary limitation of the above mentioned right”. 
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as Managing Director of Yahoo! Italy s.r.l. (owner of data processing, as it turns out
from the required Security Programmatic Document (Documento Programmatico
della Sicurezza- DPS, p. 27) – the failure to adopt the minimum security measures
(provided by art. 33 of Legislative Decree no. 196/2003 - Privacy Code) to protect
Personal data referable to users of the electronic communications services provided
by Yahoo! Italy s.r.l. (having their head office in Milan).
More specifically, despite the establishment of the recalled DPS (which was only
drafted on 2 October 2006), it was ascertained – also further to a special inspection
on computer systems in use at the company delegated to the Gruppo Pronto
Impiego of Guardia di Finanza in Milan – inappropriate rules to control access to the
application “Yahoo! Account Management Tool” (called “Legal Tool”, which in fact
enables Yahoo! Italia s.r.l. to perform inquiries on data related to the provision of
electronic communications services to its users in order to meet the Judicial
Authority requests):
The measure of rejection was confirmed by the Supreme Court of Cassation with a declaration of ineligibility of the
appeal proposed by the Prosecutor: the opinion of the Attorney General, on the point reads: “while the applicant
interpretation is however plausible, is not as binding as to deny similar plausibility to the interpretation of the decision-
maker (here the GIP is meant) set at the base of the measure challenged [..]. This, then, is already enough to deny the
foundation raised on deduction abnormity. Indeed, a court ruling can be considered abnormal when it is totally unusual,
substantiating in a decision that for singularity and unusualness of content is outside the powers of the decision-making
body, and not being against it foreseen an appropriate remedy, the appeal to the Supreme Court has the purpose to
ascertain and declare the measure as abnormal and thus removing a situation otherwise irremediable (Cass. Sez. V of
19.6.91, SERAFINI and therewith included references) [..] In the present case, conversely, the possibility to decide on the
authorisation without having to accede to PM’s request (already being wrong – in accordance with the very ruling no.
19278/05 invoked by the plaintiff – the idea that the GIP should act as the body to mere ratification of the Public
Prosecutor) is not disputed even by the applicant (given the power that derives to the GIP from art. 132 of Legislative
Decree no. 196/03).
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• In fact, people not addressed by the DPS (as in charge of data managing) as F.M.2
as well as people at the offices of Customer Care (also allocated in a different
Country, although still subject to the same Community legislation)3 could have
free access to the application at issue;
• The practical operation of this program (which allows the direct processing of
personal data of users by Yahoo! Inc.,) could not be verified,4 and the company
was therefore not able to produce a proper certification (with assumption of
responsibility on the correspondence between the data processed and the data
provided as the result of the question) when summoned to provide the judicial
authorities the information requested;
2  “Q.: Do you want to specify who are the persons entitled to use the ‘Legal Tools’ or otherwise known as ‘Yahoo!
Account Management Tool’?
A.: To obtain access the Legal Tool is enabled, in addition to me, Dr. F.M., as Legal Secondee. I clarify that F. is not an
employee of Yahoo! Italy, but an external consultant. Each of us has access to the system by inserting a personal
“Yahoo! ID” which uniquely identifies whomever accesses the service. Therefore the system is able to determine with
precision who benefits from the service. No one else is authorized to do so.” (Statements from C. to Public Prosecutor on
12.2.2007).
3  “D.: Did you know Mrs S.F.?
A.: Yes, I know her, because when I started to work for Yahoo! Mrs. F. was the assistant to the then General Counsel P.
and was the person responsible for the Legal Tools for the investigation requests received by the Judicial Authority. At
the time of my arrival at Yahoo! the use of the Legal Tools in Italy was authorized by lawyer P. and Mrs. F.. I do not
remember to when, back in time, my authorization to examine the Legal Tools was given, in any case when P. quit from
Yahoo! I was the only person enabled. I would point out however that Mrs F. was transferred to the “customer care”
service in Dublin, and that it still possible to her to obtain access to the Legal Tools, also on Italian data, and this
depends on her customer service related tasks, such as the password recovery, I also clarify that the Italian legal office
has the principal task of responding to the demands of the Italian authorities, and primarily for this purpose the Legal
Tool was created. I also point out that this application was created in 2001 and is used by me only for that purpose. I
note that P. indicated 2003/2004 as the date of installation of the Legal Tool, but I might be mistaken instead.
Q.: Currently, who are the other persons entitled to obtain access to the Legal Tool?
A.: As far as I know now, apart from me and Mrs. F., Dr. C.F. is enabled, who arrived in Yahoo! in the month of March
2006. I do not remember exactly when P. left Yahoo! I note that he said in October 2005. In any case, since P. left Yahoo!
until the arrival of C., I was the only one that was enabled to use the Legal Tool, with the clarification that I did with the
possibility of F..” (Statements from F. to public Prosecutor on 27.6.2007).
4  “Q.: The Yahoo! Inc. system recognizes the IP address from which the registration is done regardless of the chosen
language?
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• Moreover, the same application program, in respect of a questionable company
policy,5 was programmed not to provide the data required by the judicial
authorities where the user, despite having signed the contract for electronic
communications services in Italy,6 has decided that it is regulated by national
legislation other than the Italian law;
• It was not possible for the company Yahoo! Italy s.r.l. (although the owner of the
service), to have access to the logs of the enquiry operations (which could
therefore be put in place freely, without fear of being identified later, by persons in
any case not authorized by the Italian company on the basis of their specific
appointment relevant to the Legislative Decree no. 196/2003) since this is a
program aimed at questioning the factual data on foreign servers.7
This program, in fact “uncontrollable” by Yahoo! Italy s.r.l. (in point of view both of
access and verification of the results generated by it), entailed – in at least one
A.: As of now I can not answer, also because the criteria on which basis this tool returns the data are known to me only
because I have been so reported by the parent Company. As I have already said, there is no real technical and
operational manual in which the search criteria of this tool on the database of Yahoo! are attested by Yahoo! Inc.”
(Statements from C. to Public Prosecutor on 12.2.2007).
5  See p. 19 D.P.S.
6  See Notification of Deputy Prosecutor Gianluca Braghò on 25.6.2007 for the facts relating to a criminal proceeding in
charge to his office.
7  “Q.: Is there any activity related to access mailboxes @yahoo.it that can be documented, with its creation of log files,
by servers owned by Yahoo! Italy s.r.l. or by a server owned by Yahoo Group?
A.: In Italy there is no server to provide services to Italian Yahoo users, in that the servers network is centralized abroad
or there are different “server farms” both in European countries (for example in London and Ireland) and in America.”
(Statements from M.M. to Public Prosecutor on 12.2.2007).
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recorded case –the failure to communicate to the Judicial Authority that requested
the flow of communications on the network traffic (an exchange of e-mail, however,
found by the police as yet delegated stored in the suspect’s e-mail box @yahoo.it
even if it was not provided by Yahoo!, Inc. in the 15 days of operational
interceptions),8 which had a remarkable detriment to the ongoing investigations.
According to this Prosecutor Office, even from this “impossibility to have control on”
the application called Yahoo! Account Management Tool stemmed, in contrast, an
undue treatment of personal data, being possible that information other than those
actually present on foreign servers could be erroneously reported to the judicial
authorities, with considerable damage to interested users, even given the broad
diffusion of electronic communications services offered by Yahoo! Italy s.r.l.
2. Under the combined provisions of Articles 169 paragraph 2 of Legislative Decree
no. 196/2003 and 22 paragraph 1 of Legislative Decree no. 758/1994, on 23 October
2007 the documents relating to the criminal proceedings in question were
consequently sent to the Privacy Authority, in order to properly evaluate the need to
8 See minutes of operations carried out by the PM on 30 August 2007 and subsequent remark of PG (Polizia Giudiziaria,
i.e. “Investigative Police”), 4 October 2007 (i.e. the investigation on transnational criminal organizations engaged in
phishing).
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provide – with specific measures – what provisions were necessary to remove the
incorrect behaviour at issue.
The Privacy Authority Office was also urged to consider the findings of this judicial
authority (i.e. the Prosecutor) for its own assessment of the results to the public
consultation, and referred to the deliberation of 19 September 2007 on “measures
and arrangements to ensure those concerned with regard to the retention of traffic
data and telephone line for the purposes of investigation and prosecution of
crimes”, as Yahoo! Italy s.r.l. (and notwithstanding what is stated at page 5 of the
mentioned DPS and stated by the Director of Legal Affairs9 as well as by the
Managing Director10) is a company that deals with personal data related to the
provision to the public of electronic communication services over public networks of
communications (art. 3 Directive 2002/58/EC).
3. After a formal reminder dated 4 February 2008,11 on 2 April 2008, the Privacy
Authority informed12 Yahoo! Italy s.r.l. that it had taken action to adopt a prescriptive
measure under Article 169 paragraph 2of the Privacy Code in order to adopt those
9 “Q: Are you aware of any time limit dictated by the current legislation on the retention of log files as per art. 132
Legislative Decree no. 196/2003? [...].
R. Yes, we are aware and on some occasions we have acted as spoke persons (the witness means they were proactive in
making their parent company aware of) towards our parent company, through the entire internal bureaucratic
procedure, on the existence of the text of the law at issue. Among other things I repeat that according to the
interpretation that Yahoo! has of the rule, we do not believe that we have contravened the legal requirements, by virtue
of the fact that we do not provide, in the normal course of events, traffic telematic services.” (Statements from C. made
to the delegated PG on 14.9.2006).
10 “I would point out that, technically, Yahoo! Italy s.r.l. does not provide traffic telematic services if strictly intended for
traffic telematic means access to the Internet. With regard to electronic mail services and instant messaging, Yahoo! Italy
s.r.l. license is only for those services that are actually delivered by Yahoo! Inc. based in California (USA). We are aware
of the problems related to “jurisdiction” of the Internet, and then when someone decides to open a mailbox @yahoo.it,
they sign a declaration to that effect. I beforehand state that in order to obtain access to the multitude of services
offered by our portal, during the first registration each user is assigned a unique ID; when the user, during the
registration phase, is asked what language shall be used, in that very moment is identified what the Americans call “Net
Citizen Ship” or a kind of “citizenship” in the network. The meaning of this is that it is not the company who declares
what its own jurisdiction is, but it is the citizen who declares it at subscription time, and if a citizen asks for the
assignment of a mailbox @yahoo.it, but indicates a language different from Italian, he is proposed the terms and
conditions related to the legislation in force in the country of the chosen language.” (Statements from M.M. to Public
Prosecutor on 12.2.2007).
11 As the deadline of 60 days in accordance with articles 169 paragraph 2 Legislative Decree no. 196/2003 and 22
paragraph 2 Legislative Decree no. 758/1994.
12 See the remark in answering acts.
178 Digital Evidence and Electronic Signature Law Review, Vol 6 © Pario Communications Limited, 2009
REQUEST FOR ARCHIVING
security measures that, on the basis of investigations conducted by the Prosecutor,
had not been enforced (see decision of 13 March 2008 and note of the Department
Inspections and Sanctions).
Moreover, in that note, the Director of the Department of Inspections and Sanctions
at the Privacy Authority concluded the results of its investigation as follows:
“The investigation by the Milan Prosecutor [..] reveals some elements on the
lawfulness of the treatments which, although not fully defined under the
procedure provided for in art. 169 paragraph 2 of the [Privacy] Code, are in any
case worthy of study by the Authority. [...] Nevertheless, a close examination also
seems appropriate to clarify the scope of the application of other provisions of the
Code (e.g. art. 132) which are referred to by the Prosecutor of the Milan
investigation, even if not related to the matter of minimum security measures in
the light of the decision on the telephone and telematics traffic data security
adopted on 17 January 2008.”
HAVING NOTED THAT
- On 27 September 2008 the Office of the Privacy Authority stated that the suspect,
following the exhaustive fulfilment of prescriptions issued,13 paid the fine
13 That is:
1. appoint agents in accordance with art. 30 of the Privacy Code of all persons involved in the consultation of the
personal data of users Yahoo! through the account management tool;
2. implemented, for treatments related to these data, the measures envisaged by rules 1-10, 12-14 and 27 of the
technical specification set out in Annex B of the Code;
3. adopt an updated paper on security in terms and forms required by Rule No. 19 of the technical specification set out in
Annex B) of the Code.
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(12,500.00 euros) equal to one quarter of the maximum fine value established by
the rule infringed;
- The documentation filed by the defender’s lawyers on 10 September 2008 (or
rather copies of documents submitted to the Authority in order to fulfil the
requirements given) has enabled this Prosecutor to ascertain the exact fulfilment;
- no further aspects relevant to the criminal law emerge in addition to those already
subject to requirements or provisions;
- However, the same company, on 9 September 2008 informed the Authority that
“even under the recent Legislative Decree no. 109 of 30 May 2008, it has been
working to prepare the technical measures necessary to ensure the tracking and
storage of electronic data traffic (i.e. log files, data related to users’ access to
Yahoo Properties)14 for a period of 12 months, log files from the date of 21
November 2007 are already available”, further stating – with communication to
this Prosecutor on 10 September 2008 – that “these measures have been taken
for other European companies of the Group which, according to various local
provisions, have implemented them.”
14 This means “the web-based services offered by Yahoo! for the use of which the users prior registration to the official
website ... www.yahoo.it is required through an appropriate application form, or rather the subsequent identification by
entering a username and password”.
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HAVING OCCURRED
therefore, with the fulfilment and the payment, the extinction of the crime, in
accordance with art. 169 paragraph 2 of the Privacy Code
Viewed Articles. 411 of the Code of Criminal proceedings, 125 of the Legislative
Decree no. 271/89
CALLS
that the judge for preliminary investigations should file the proceedings and order
the return of documents resulting to its office.
Milan, 16 October 2008
THE PROSECUTOR OF THE REPUBLIC
Francesco CAJANI - Deputy.
The editor thanks Francesco Cajani and Ing. Franco Ruggieri, FIR DIG Consultants di Ruggieri Franco & C
s.a.s., for taking the trouble to check this unofficial translation for accuracy. All mistakes remain those of
the editor.
Postscript
The Judge at the Court of Milan (decree no. 223087/08 R.G. GIP of 24.3.2009) accepted this request in
accordance with the provisions of article 169 of the Decreto Legislativo 30 giugno 2003, n. 196 Codice in
materia di protezione dei dati personali (pubblicato nella Gazzetta Ufficiale n. 174 del 29 luglio 2003 -
Supplemento Ordinario n. 123) (section 169 of the Personal Data Protection Code (Legislative Decree no.
196 dated 30 June 2003)) since “le considerazioni in fatto e in diritto svolte dal P.M. vanno integralmente
condivise” “regarding the facts and the law, the arguments of the Public Prosecutor are fully shared”.
With this decision of the Judge, the case can now be considered public and it can be published.
During the investigation, it was discovered that Yahoo! Italia s.r.l. failed to adopt minimum security
measures (because a great number of Yahoo! employees were free to enter the Yahoo! Account
Management Tool from several of the European branches of Yahoo!). The indictment was transferred to
the Garante per la protezione dei dati personali (Italian Privacy Authority), who confirmed the technical
investigation and that the legal approach taken by the Prosecutor was correct. After this, Yahoo! Italia
s.r.l. decided to adopt the measures set out above, and to pay the fine (12,500.00 euros), so that the
Public Prosecutor, Francesco Cajani, was then required to request the Judge to close the criminal case.
The legal implications of the case are described in the paper, in particular, the attorneys for Yahoo! Italia
s.r.l. indicated to the Public Prosecutor’s Office in Milan that the company would spontaneously conform
to Decreto legislativo 30 maggio 2008, n. 109 (Legislative decree no. 109 dated 30 May 2008 :
Transposition of Directive 2006/24/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 March 2006,
on the Retention of Data Generated or Processed in Connection with the Provision of Publicly Available
Electronic Communication Services or Public Communications Networks and Amending Directive
2002/58/EC) by storing log files for twelve months in future.
